

# Glendale Community College District Updated CVRA Analysis

The California Voting Rights Act was enacted in 2002 and focuses exclusively on the use of at-large election systems. As defined in the law, at-large systems include any election method except single member districts in which only the area voters select their representative. The law does not create any oversight agency or empower any state agency to implement the law, instead, it is left to the courts.

Unlike federal Voting Rights Act cases, CVRA suits can be filed in local courts and costs for litigation fully recoverable from the successful plaintiff. In order to be successful, the plaintiffs must only prove that racially polarized voting exists and that the subgroup could influence elections under a different system.

Racially polarized voting exists where a protected minority group has a preference for one candidate or issue, while the majority has a preference for another. In order to establish racially polarized voting, California law requires courts to look to methodologies used in applicable federal cases to enforce the federal Voting Rights Act. In *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), the Supreme Court noted that reliable inferences about voting behavior could be derived from a number of techniques, including homogenous precinct analysis (HPA) and regression analysis.

One circumstance that may be considered under CVRA is the extent to which candidates who are members of a protected class, and who are preferred by voters of the protected class, have been elected to the governing body of a particular political subdivision. This is considered probative evidence, but it alone does not preclude or create a successful claim under CVRA.

## Thornburg v. Gingles

In the precedent setting *Gingles* case the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision that racially polarized voting existed in North Carolina. The evidence included statistical analysis that showed African American support for black candidates was overwhelming in almost every election. In all but 5 of 16 primary elections, African American showed overwhelming support for African American candidates.

The trial court found that a substantial majority of white voters would not vote for an African American candidate. In the general elections, white voters almost always ranked black candidates either last or next to last in the multicandidate field, except in heavily Democratic areas where white voters consistently ranked black candidates last among the Democrats, if not last or next to last among all candidates.



The court went on to state:

*"...Multimember districts may impair the ability of blacks to elect representatives of their choice where blacks vote sufficiently as a bloc as to be able to elect their preferred candidates in a black majority, single-member district and where a white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc usually to defeat the candidates chosen by blacks. It is the difference between the choices made by blacks and whites – not the reasons for that difference – that results in blacks having less opportunity than whites to elect their preferred representatives. Consequently, we conclude that under the "results test" of § 2, only the correlation between race of voter and selection of certain candidates, not the causes of the correlation, matters."*

### Measuring Degree of Polarized Voting

Redistricting Partners utilizes four methods for determining racially polarized voting for the purposes of analyzing a board's risk under the CVRA:

#### *Visual Analysis*

The simplest method for estimating voting behavior by race/ethnicity is to overlay a map of election results with a similar map of ethnic densities. This is a non-statistical technique that can provide a user-friendly understanding of the relationship between ethnic groups and election results. When the pattern of elections and ethnic groups looks similar there is a strong rationale for further analysis.

#### *Homogeneous Precinct Analysis*

The first level of data analysis is of voting patterns in homogenous census blocks – small areas that are composed of a single racial group. The voting patterns of minorities in these blocks are analyzed and compared to similar areas with very few minority voters.

In the absence of exit polls and direct access to individual ballots, this common measure of racially polarized voting provides a high-confidence way to see voting patterns. Since precincts are usually not exclusively one race, those with greater than 80% or more individuals of a single race are considered homogeneous. In order to have statistical validity there should be a large number of homogenous precincts. In some parts of the state aggregation of many census blocks will provide a final analysis of several thousand individual vote results in a cluster that is 90% or more of one single race.

#### *Regression / Trend Line Analysis*

A trend line analysis is done using all the census block level election results from a candidate race or ballot measure. The results for each area are placed in a formula with a variable to be studied, such as ethnicity. The data points are each individually plotted with a simple regression to overlay a trend line. This trend line will show how the vote for or against a candidate or ballot measure increases or decreases as the variable changes.

The resulting formula in the format of  $Y=mX+B$ , with  $m$ =slope, provides a quick way to compare the trend between different groups. A large positive slope shows a correlation between votes and that ethnic group, pointing to bloc voting. A negative slope would

show that the group is bloc voting against the candidate or issue. A low absolute value for  $m$  suggests there is little or no correlation between the density of the variable group in the census block and the election outcome.

This analysis also gives an r-squared value which shows how tightly the data falls around the trend line. An r-squared higher than .2 shows some relationship, a .4 would be strong, and anything above .6 is extremely strong.

#### *Multivariable Regression*

In cases where the racially polarized voting cannot be identified through the above means, a deeper regression analysis can be conducted to identify the impact of ethnic subgroup as compared to other variables such as income, age, gender, educational level, etc... This Environmental Regression Analysis provides one additional layer of information when the results from other methods are unclear.

## CALIFORNIA ELECTIONS CODE SECTION 14025-14032

**14025.** This act shall be known and may be cited as the California Voting Rights Act of 2001.

**14026.** As used in this chapter:

(a) "At-large method of election" means any of the following methods of electing members to the governing body of a political subdivision:

(1) One in which the voters of the entire jurisdiction elect the members to the governing body.

(2) One in which the candidates are required to reside within given areas of the jurisdiction and the voters of the entire jurisdiction elect the members to the governing body.

(3) One which combines at-large elections with district-based elections.

(b) "District-based elections" means a method of electing members to the governing body of a political subdivision in which the candidate must reside within an election district that is a divisible part of the political subdivision and is elected only by voters residing within that election district.

(c) "Political subdivision" means a geographic area of representation created for the provision of government services, including, but not limited to, a city, a school district, a community college district, or other district organized pursuant to state law.

(d) "Protected class" means a class of voters who are members of a race, color or language minority group, as this class is referenced and defined in the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.).

(e) "Racially polarized voting" means voting in which there is a difference, as defined in case law regarding enforcement of the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.), in the choice of candidates or other electoral choices that are preferred by voters in a protected class, and in the choice of candidates and

electoral choices that are preferred by voters in the rest of the electorate. The methodologies for estimating group voting behavior as approved in applicable federal cases to enforce the federal Voting Rights Act (42 U.S.C. Sec. 1973 et seq.) to establish racially polarized voting may be used for purposes of this section to prove that elections are characterized by racially polarized voting.

**14027.** An at-large method of election may not be imposed or applied in a manner that impairs the ability of a protected class to elect candidates of its choice or its ability to influence the outcome of an election, as a result of the dilution or the abridgment of the rights of voters who are members of a protected class, as defined pursuant to Section 14026.

**14028.** (a) A violation of Section 14027 is established if it is shown that racially polarized voting occurs in elections for members of the governing body of the political subdivision or in elections incorporating other electoral choices by the voters of the political subdivision. Elections conducted prior to the filing of an action pursuant to Section 14027 and this section are more probative to establish the existence of racially polarized voting than elections conducted after the filing of the action.

(b) The occurrence of racially polarized voting shall be determined from examining results of elections in which at least one candidate is a member of a protected class or elections involving ballot measures, or other electoral choices that affect the rights and privileges of members of a protected class. One circumstance that may be considered in determining a violation of Section 14027 and this section is the extent to which candidates who are members of a protected class and who are preferred by voters of the protected class, as determined by an analysis of voting behavior, have been elected to the governing body of a political subdivision that is the subject of an

action based on Section 14027 and this section. In multiseat at-large election districts, where the number of candidates who are members of a protected class is fewer than the number of seats available, the relative groupwide support received by candidates from members of a protected class shall be the basis for the racial polarization analysis.

(c) The fact that members of a protected class are not geographically compact or concentrated may not preclude a finding of racially polarized voting, or a violation of Section 14027 and this section, but may be a factor in determining an appropriate remedy.

(d) Proof of an intent on the part of the voters or elected officials to discriminate against a protected class is not required.

(e) Other factors such as the history of discrimination, the use of electoral devices or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the dilutive effects of at-large elections, denial of access to those processes determining which groups of candidates will receive financial or other support in a given election, the extent to which members of a protected class bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns are probative, but

not necessary factors to establish a violation of Section 14027 and this section.

**14029.** Upon a finding of a violation of Section 14027 and Section 14028, the court shall implement appropriate remedies, including the imposition of district-based elections, that are tailored to remedy the violation.

**14030.** In any action to enforce Section 14027 and Section 14028, the court shall allow the prevailing plaintiff party, other than the state or political subdivision thereof, a reasonable attorney's fee consistent with the standards established in *Serrano v. Priest* (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 48-49, and litigation expenses including, but not limited to, expert witness fees and expenses as part of the costs. Prevailing defendant parties shall not recover any costs, unless the court finds the action to be frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation.

**14031.** This chapter is enacted to implement the guarantees of Section 7 of Article I and of Section 2 of Article II of the California Constitution.

**14032.** Any voter who is a member of a protected class and who resides in a political subdivision where a violation of Sections 14027 and 14028 is alleged may file an action pursuant to those sections in the superior court of the county in which the political subdivision is located.

## Analysis of Election Results

The city of Glendale and extended area of LaCrescenta within the Glendale CCD and GUSD comprises approximately 50 voting precincts. While the intermixing of Armenian population within the most heavily Latino precincts made it impossible to perform a standard Homogenous Precinct Analysis, there are numerous data-points on which to perform a regression analysis.

Analysis was done on a number of candidate contests and ballot measures. Our preliminary findings using bivariate regression analysis found:

- 1) Strong Armenian racially polarized bloc voting. Armenians in Glendale show some of the strongest group voting patterns in the state.
- 2) Non-Armenian White voting patterns against Armenian candidates.
- 3) Some similar patterns in the limited Latino contests. These races were less numerous and in a couple cases less severe than the Armenian figures, but still something that could be a point of concern.
- 4) Weak polarized voting in the one Asian contest, with white Voters and Asians seemingly aligned.

After presenting our analysis the Community College League offered to conduct an independent review of our results by an out of state expert in racially-polarized voting analysis. This consultant, Dr. Matt Barretto, independently conducted an analysis of the election data using a couple different techniques. One difference in his analysis was the weighting of precincts based on the raw number of voters - and as can be seen in his charts the points for each result are larger or smaller depending on the raw number of voters in that precinct. The second difference was his use of multivariate regression analysis to allow stronger differentiation between Latinos and Armenians in precincts where both have strong representation.

His analysis:

- 1) Finds racially polarized voting in 27 of the 30 elections analyzed.
- 2) Confirmed our results of Armenian bloc-voting.
- 3) Confirmed the non-Armenian White voting patterns against Armenian candidates, providing in several cases higher correlations or r-squared values.
- 4) Found stronger Latino racially polarized voting and stronger non-Armenian bloc voting against Latinos using the USD/CCD and city elections along with additional review of countywide and judicial contests.

- 5) Found less bloc voting in the Armenian community against Latinos and less bloc-voting in the Latino community against Armenians.

Where our analysis showed racially polarized voting for and against Latinos, the need to go to districts in order to remedy the voting pattern was unclear. The preliminary analysis from Dr. Barretto does not give the district the same latitude. His review of the data, in part, states:

*In the absence of district-based elections, the election data we analyzed provides quite clear evidence that Latinos face considerable racial bloc voting which greatly diminishes their chances to win representation in Glendale.*



## Races Showing Latino RPV

### **Gus Gomez**

In the 2003 City Council contest, Latino voters were presented with only one candidate with a Latino surname. This candidate, Gus Gomez, experienced very high support rate among Latino voters.

As the following shows, the vote for Gomez among the Latino community was extremely strong. As the precinct becomes more Latino (going right to left) the percent of support for Gomez increases consistently.


Additionally, this result is tightly wrapped around the trendline, with just a couple outliers. Based on supreme court guidance the r-squared value of .39 for Latino support and .399 for White votes against Gomez would be sufficient to show that race was a predominant factor in the decision-making.



Because the data is so tightly compacted to the trendline you can predict the outcome of the election result merely by knowing the percent Latino or White in that precinct. Using basic

substitution method we can model what the result would be in a precinct with 100% Latino, 0% Latino or something in between.

The Barreto multivariable regression analysis was able to cleave some of the impacts of the Latino vote away from the Armenian vote to develop a similar model.




In the Barreto analysis the r-squared value increases to .69 with the Latino Vote at 67% for Gomez, Armenian at 17%, Asian at 51% and white at an extremely low 2.5%.


### Odalís Suarez

In the 2003 Unified School District Board of Trustees contest, Latino voters once again had only one candidate with a Latino surname. Odalís Suarez experienced a strong level of support for Latinos and that result can be found to be tightly congregated around the trendline. The slope of this line is .62 meaning that for every 10 additional voters you would expect Suarez to obtain support from 6.2 of them. The .6 r-squared value shows a strong relationship between the result and race as the driving factor.

In this race the White voters were seemingly vote blocking against Suarez, albeit with a lower correlation. The r-squared of .24 does have some significance in showing race as a predominant factor, but here the bivariate analysis provides a less-compelling result.




The Barreto analysis provides nearly identical results for Latino support for Suarez but was also able to show in the multivariable analysis that Armenian Whites were supporting Suarez at a higher rate than other White voters. The Non-Armenian, Non-White voter was providing less than 3% support for Suarez.




### Nayiri Nahabedian

In a strong example of crossover Latino voting, our analysis showed strong racial bloc voting for Nahabedian in her 2005 school board race from both Armenians and Latinos.



This result was confirmed and shown to be even stronger in the Barreto analysis. The adjusted r-squared in the Barreto analysis was .8 and suggested she received almost no votes from non-Armenian whites.




The crossover voting for Nahabedian provides some evidence that the election of Armenians from heavily Latino communities could be an appropriate expression of their non-diluted voter choice. A similar results were found for Rafi Manoukian in 2003 and Ara Najarian in 2005,

### Other Elections


The 2006 Democratic Primary contest between Krekorian and Quintero was also analyzed by Redistricting Partners for evidence of racial polarization. This contest between Armenian and Latino candidates provides a glimpse at a contest where race was apparently a factor as two of the minority groups within the District took opposite sides and there was no third white candidate to absorb the non-ethnic vote.

This contest would also be important in a Voting Rights Act case because it did see a mailer that would be considered a direct appeal to race or ethnicity. That mailer, sent by an independent campaign committee for Quintero, attacked Krekorian for supposed ties to terrorist organizations and attacked him and his wife for donating to an Armenian school.



This analysis shows that Latino voters had a strong support rate of 71% for Quintero. This is telling in the face of Krekorian’s 51% support rate in the city and Quintero’s defeat.


The Barretto analysis looked at additional races in order to determine Latino racial bloc voting given the shortage of other local races to review. All four contests provided evidence of strong racially polarized voting with r-squares ranging from one at .4, two at .68 and one at .7.



Analysis of statewide candidate results by Barreto showed some bloc voting by the Latino community, but like the Redistricting Partners analysis this was not as compelling because it had relatively low correlation values – each at .2 or lower.


### Combined Latino Candidates

In a follow-up analysis, the Redistricting Partners study looked at support rates for Gomez were compared to support rates for Suarez, to determine any similarity between supportive voters for the two candidates. It is noteworthy here that Gomez was a Democrat and Suarez was a Republican.



This analysis shows that Suarez supporters had a very high trend towards support Gomez and reinforces Latino voters were selecting these candidates based on surname, not issues or partisanship.

A similar method was used by Barreto to identify Latino bloc voting within several races combined. Where our look at two races showed a correlation of .625, the Barreto analysis showed a .648.



### Contests without Latino RPV

One Latino contest which stood out in the analysis for not having racial-bloc voting among the Latino community was that of Christine Rodriguez for Community College Board in 2007. Both the Redistricting Partners and Barreto analysis showed nearly identical flat results. It is unclear what would cause this result, but it is clearly an outlier.




### Races Showing Armenian RPV

Racially polarized voting among the Armenian community, and by non-Armenian whites against the Armenian community, is extremely strong and seen in dozens of races analyzed. Looking just at three Glendale CCD elections alone provides sufficient evidence of RPV.

#### Armine Hacopian

Boardmember Hacopian ran in a field of four candidates, placing 2nd. Finishing with 12,937 votes, Hacopian garnered 28% of the overall vote, led by a strong Armenian turnout that gave her a support rate of 52%. Latinos also supported Hacopian at a rate of 39% with non-Armenian whites providing only 15% support.




The regression analysis in this contest shows a strong .81 – one of the highest correlations seen statewide among all of our RPV analyses.

The non-Armenian vote is extremely strong and tightly correlated with an r-squared of .73.


#### Vahe Perroomian 2011

Boardmember Perroomian ran in a field of 3 candidates and finished 1st. Vahe Perroomian garnered 3,514 votes, 37% of the vote. Non-Armenian Whites show a negative trend with a 27% support rate in the regression analysis together with the Latinos at a 35% support rate. This contrasts with positive trends from the Armenian population at a 56% support rate.




### Vahe Peroomian 2007

The earlier contest with Peroomian showed similar racial bloc-voting. In that election he finished 2nd in a field of three candidates. Peroomian garnered 9,575 votes, 31.6% of the total vote.. The calculated non-Armeian support showed a negative trend with a 0% support rate. This contrasted with the positive trends of both other; 82% Latino and 78% Armenian.




### Combined Armenian Candidates

Due to the very large number of candidates in the 2005 our analysis was initially performed on the Glendale’s two primary minority groups instead of individual candidates or ethnicities. The density of Latinos and Armenians in a precinct was compared to the success of candidates who were neither Latino nor Armenian.





These regressions indicate a strong trend among minority voters against supporting Non-Latino, Non-Armenian White candidates. This trend indicates that minority voters are polarized to vote for minority candidates.

Similar to the 2005 contests, a dense field made it possible to look at 2011 contests in the aggregate. The success of Armenian and Non-Armenian White candidates was compared to Concentrations of Armenians and Latinos by precinct.



The chart to the left shows the positive relationship between Armenian voter concentrations and the success of two Armenian candidates, Gharpetian and Peroomian.

The charts below demonstrate the negative relationship between Latino density and two candidates who were neither Latino nor Armenian, and the positive relationship between Non-Hispanic White density and the same two candidates.



In both cases, there are strong indications of racial polarization in the recent November elections.

### Additional Data

Regression analyses were also performed on many statewide contests. Each of these analysis are provided in the attached packet. This combines contests analyzed by Redistricting Partner and those looked at by Barreto.

### Potential Impacts of Districts

Two plans were created as a test for viability of Voting Rights Act or CVRA compliant district lines. The pertinent details of these plans are below:

#### **Plan A**

Lines drawn using both neighborhood lines and major geography such as freeways.

Neighborhoods by District:

1. Crescenta Highlands, Montrose Verdugo City, San Gabriel Mountains, Whiting Woods
2. Brockmont, Chevy Chase, College Hills, Emerald Isle, Glenoaks Canyon/ Scholl Canyon, Greenbriar, Montecito Park, Oakmont, Rancho San Rafael, Rossmoyne, San Rafael Hills, Sparr Heights, Verdugo Mountains, Verdugo Woodlands, Woodbury
3. El Miradero, Fremont Park, Glenwood, Grand Central, Grandview, Pelanconi, Riverside Rancho, Verdugo Viejo
4. Citrus Grove, City Center, Moorpark, Vineyard
5. Adams Hill, Mariposa, Pacific-Edison, Somerset, Tropico

This configuration gives a district with one Latino majority seat. Armenian populations for these districts cannot be determined using the census data, but are available as voting percentages.

| District | Population | Deviation | Latino | CVAP Latino | Armenian |
|----------|------------|-----------|--------|-------------|----------|
| 1        | 43,070     | 0.70%     | 11.24% | 10.10%      | 10%      |
|          | 42,202     | -1.33%    | 11.39% | 10.38%      | 25%      |
| 3        | 43,240     | 1.10%     | 14.41% | 14.99%      | 33%      |
| 4        | 42,734     | -0.08%    | 17.26% | 14.32%      | 29%      |
| 5        | 42,599     | -0.40%    | 29.52% | 24.51%      | 28%      |

**Plan B**

Lines drawn using neighborhood lines almost exclusively to generate a community of interest centered plan.

Neighborhoods by District:

1. Crescenta Highlands, Montrose Verdugo City, San Gabriel Mountains, Sparr Heights
2. Brockmont, Chevy Chase, College Hills, Emerald Isle, Glenoaks Canyon/ Scholl Canyon, Greenbriar, Montecito Park, Oakmont, Rancho San Rafael, Rossmoyne, San Rafael Hills, Verdugo Mountains, Verdugo Woodlands, Whiting Woods, Woodbury
3. El Miradero, Glenwood, Grand Central, Grandview, Pelanconi, Riverside Rancho, Verdugo Viejo
4. Citrus Grove, City Center, Mariposa, Somerset, Vineyard
5. Adams Hill, Fremont Park, Moorpark, Pacific-Edison, Tropic

| District | Population | Deviation | Latino | CVAP Latino | Armenian |
|----------|------------|-----------|--------|-------------|----------|
| 1        | 43,460     | 1.62%     | 11.40% | 10.27%      | 11%      |
| 2        | 41,812     | -2.24%    | 11.22% | 10.22%      | 24%      |
| 3        | 40,731     | -4.77%    | 14.05% | 14.25%      | 32%      |
| 4        | 44,454     | 3.94%     | 16.70% | 12.03%      | 37%      |
| 5        | 43,388     | 1.45%     | 30.05% | 26.90%      | 31%      |

## Results of Analysis

The analysis using these several contests provides a very compelling basis for determining that racially polarized voting does exist within the boundaries of the district. While the voting pattern is strongest among Armenians, those voters turnout in sufficient numbers to eliminate the negative impact usually seen through bloc voting. The Latino community, however, does have a strong claim that the at-large system is diluting their voting strength and eliminating their ability to elect candidates of choice.

The analysis also shows that districts can be drawn which would meet the “influence” standard for Latinos which seemingly have the greatest claim given their reduced representation in local government elected offices. This creates districts that have high Latino and Armenian populations, but the analysis also shows that Armenians can be the Latino candidate of choice in at least four cases.

Redistricting Partners is ready to assist the district in determining appropriate new lines and can provide the draft plans used in the above analysis as a guide.

# **An Analysis of Voting Patterns in Glendale, CA**

**By: Matt A. Barreto, Ph.D. and Sergio Garcia, M.A., University of Washington**

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## Executive Summary

We were asked by the Community College League to evaluate the extent to which voting patterns in Glendale, California are characterized by racial bloc voting. Glendale is an interesting case because it has a quite diverse population including sizable blocs of Latino, Asian American, and Armenian American voters. In order to properly assess how each constituency voted we used a variation of ecological regression, multivariable regression in which we controlled for the independent effects of each of these three unique voting groups, to best isolate each group on it's own, as well as to isolate the White, non-Armenian population. Groups such as Armenian and Latinos may have sizable populations living side-by-side in some portions of Glendale, and by conducting multiple variable regression we can accurately, and scientifically isolate each independent effect.

To conduct this analysis we obtained data on the election results for 22 local elections including city council, school board, and community college in Glendale, California. In addition, to assess whether or not the patterns in the local elections were unique, or part of a larger pattern, we selected a handful of additional exogenous elections to also analyze. These included 4 elections for county judicial offices in Los Angeles County, and 4 elections for statewide office within the Democratic Primary balloting. We merged the election results for each precinct with the percentage of voters who were either Latino, Asian American, or Armenian American, by using a surname database, as per the procedures of the UC Berkeley Statewide Database, of the Institute Governmental Studies, at the University of California. All data are from public domains and can be replicated upon request.

Across the elections we analyzed, we find strong, and statistically significant evidence of racially polarized voting in 27 of 30 elections. In almost every case we examined, Latino voters demonstrated very high levels of group cohesion in support of Latino candidates, however these same Latino candidates received very low levels of support from non-Latinos, and especially low levels of support from non-Armenian Whites. Because Latinos represent a minority of all voters in Glendale, the degree of racial bloc voting is mathematically prohibitive to Latino "candidates of choice" being elected. Among Armenians, we also find strong evidence of group cohesion in favor of Armenian candidates and far lower levels of support from non-Armenian Whites. However, because Armenians represent a much larger share of all voters than Latinos, the existence of racially polarized voting is not as costly to Armenian candidates, however in some cases it still does cause Armenian candidates to lose office when running at-large.

In the absence of district-based elections, the election data we analyzed provides quite clear evidence that Latinos face considerable racial bloc voting which greatly diminishes their chances to win representation in Glendale.